Banking Resolution

Regulation

European banking resolution rests on two 2014 texts — the BRRD, which defines the tools, and the SRMR, which created the Single Resolution Board — completed by the CRR’s TLAC rules, the 2019 banking package and a pending CMDI reform.

How the framework was built

2008-10
Global financial crisis
Ad hoc bank bailouts across Europe expose the absence of a credible regime for failing banks and set the political agenda for resolution.
2011-10
FSB Key Attributes
The Financial Stability Board publishes the global standard for resolution regimes: resolution authorities, bail-in powers, no taxpayer exposure.
2014-05
BRRD and SRMR adopted
The EU adopts the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation, the twin pillars of the framework.
2015-11
TLAC term sheet
The FSB fixes the total loss-absorbing capacity standard for global systemically important banks.
2016-01
Bail-in powers in force · SRB operational
The bail-in tool becomes applicable across the EU and the Single Resolution Board assumes its full responsibilities.
2017-06
Banco Popular resolved
First — and so far only — full resolution by the SRB: capital instruments written down or converted and the bank sold to Banco Santander for one euro.
2019-06
Banking package (BRRD II, SRMR II, CRR II)
TLAC is written into the CRR, MREL is recalibrated and subordinated, and a moratorium tool is introduced.
2023-04
CMDI reform proposed
The Commission proposes the crisis management and deposit insurance review, extending resolution to smaller and mid-sized banks. Negotiations continue.

The legal texts

Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)

Directive 2014/59/EU

The BRRD is the substantive rulebook of European resolution. It obliges every bank to maintain a recovery plan and every authority a resolution plan, defines the conditions for resolution, and creates the four resolution tools — sale of business, bridge institution, asset separation and bail-in. It applies across the whole EU and, through national transposition, governs how any European bank fails.

Art. 32
Conditions for resolution (FOLTF, no private alternative, public interest)
Art. 34
No creditor worse off than in insolvency (NCWO)
Arts. 43–44
The bail-in tool and its scope
Art. 45
MREL — minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities
Art. 59
Write-down and conversion of capital instruments

Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRMR)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014

The SRMR builds the institutional machinery of the banking union: it establishes the Single Resolution Board, centralises resolution decisions for significant and cross-border banks, and creates the Single Resolution Fund. Where the BRRD says what can be done, the SRMR says who decides — the SRB adopts the scheme, the Commission endorses it, and national authorities execute it.

Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) — TLAC

Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, as amended

Since the 2019 banking package the CRR carries the FSB’s TLAC standard into directly applicable EU law: Article 92a sets the requirement for global systemically important institutions, and Articles 72a–72l define which liabilities are eligible — the legal test behind the instrument classifications used across this site.

Art. 92a
TLAC requirement for G-SIIs
Arts. 72a–72l
Eligible liabilities items and deductions

2019 banking package (BRRD II · SRMR II · CRR II)

Directive (EU) 2019/879 · Regulation (EU) 2019/877 · Regulation (EU) 2019/876

The 2019 review aligned the EU framework with TLAC and recalibrated MREL: requirements are now expressed against risk-weighted assets and leverage exposure, subordination expectations are explicit, and authorities gained the power to suspend payments (moratorium) at the point of failure. Most MREL decisions the SRB publishes today are set under this package.

Creditor hierarchy directive

Directive (EU) 2017/2399

This short amendment to the BRRD created the senior non-preferred class: ordinary unsecured debt that ranks below other senior liabilities but above subordinated instruments. It gave banks across the EU a harmonised layer for issuing MREL-eligible senior debt, and is the reason the SNP class exists in the instruments explorer.

Crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) review

Commission proposal, April 2023

The pending CMDI reform would widen the public-interest test so that resolution — rather than national insolvency — becomes the default for mid-sized banks, and would make deposit guarantee scheme funds easier to use in resolution. The proposal is under negotiation between the Parliament and the Council; this page will track the outcome.

Definitions of the concepts these texts introduce — bail-in, MREL, the public interest assessment, the creditor hierarchy — live in the glossary. How they have been applied in practice is covered in cases.